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Laws of Adoption.

Implanted in the heart of man are certain
affections.
is

One of the truest and purest of these

that which exists between parent and child.

in

all quarters of the earth, among the different
raceB of men and through all eras of the world's
history,

the

character of this relstion has been

an index to the existing stages of civilization.
The literature of all lands redounds with tributes
to parental affection and filial

love.

The sun-

shine of child life comes alike to the lralace and
to the peasant's cottage.--

Who can n-ariber the

hearths that have been gladdened Ly the laughter of
children?

But it often happens that the marital

relation is not productive of issue, so that lands
and titles are lost and broken in thei-r line of descent, lives become drear and blank, and cheerless
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'

old age is unaccompanicd
fection.

by youthful love and af-

These misfortunes are diminished and

overcome by adoption or the legal relation created
by a person taking a child of another into his own
family, by which he assumes all the rights and liabilities of the natural parent and the child for
all purposes is deemed his ovrn.
Adoption with its legal consequences was
well known to the ancients,and the civil law expressly sanctioned it, while on the other hand it
was totally unknown if not repugnant to the common
l aw.
During the time of Justinian the law of
adoption suffered considerable change.

Before

that time the effect of adoption was to :lace the
person adopted in the same position as he would
have held, had he been born a son of
adopting him.

He bore the name of his adoptive

father, and was his heir at law.
by Justinian, however,
acter.

-3-_,3on

The changes made

comlpletely altered its

char-

It had sometimes happened under the old
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law, that a son lost his succession to his own
father by being adopted and to his adopted father,
by a subsequent emancipation.

To remedy this,

Justinian provided that the son given in adoption
to a stranger, should be in the same position to
his own father as before, but gain by adoption the
succession to his adopted father if the adopted
father die intestate.

The adoptive person, however, was not
bound like the natural father to leavohim
of his property if he made a will.
still

remained in

a share

The adopted son

the family of his natural father

and the only change which adoption caused was, that
he acquired a right of succession to his adoptive
father if intost,Ate. ( Cooper's Justinian 29 )
This doctrine was transmitted to the modern nations
of Europe.
Adoption was, also, recognized by the
Code Nayoleon, though it contained the very stringent provisions that the adopter must be fifty years
of age and without living children or legitimate
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descendants, fifteen years older than the person
adopted and a probationary period of six years
being required before the adoption takes effect.
The law as laid down by Napoleon was *adopfted by
Louisana.

From the Spanish law it was transmitted

to Mexico, thence to Texas, and thus into the U.S.
Adoption being unknown under the common
law is of purely statutory origin in this country.
Mass.

was the first

this subject.

In

state to enact laws governing
1857,

a law was passed in that

state which conferred this right.

Subsequently,

this statute came before the courts in the case
Sewall v.

Roberts, 115 Mass., 262, where it was

found to be to general and comprehensive.

The no-

tice of the legislature was brought to these defects,
and after having appointed a commission to investigate and report the matter, a statute was passed in
1876, which because of its conciseness and completeness
over previous legislation, has been accepted
as a model by other states.

Since 1857, following

the example of Mass., nearly every state in the
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Union has -assed statutesupon this subject.

These

statutesvary much in their details, but have a common intent and purpose.

Most of the statuteShave

been found defective br to narrow, necessitating
amendments ar a revision, so that the law as a
whole has been in a transitory state.

Little lit-

igation, however,has arisen over the subject, as the
adopting parents do not prefer to die intestate, and
all controversies over the property being removed,
their is nothing left in regard to the statutes
over which men would naturally quarrel.
Who can adpt?

All the statutes

Who can Adopt?

All the statutes agree that the adopter
must be an adult.

Following closely the Code Na-

the original statute of Louisana,

poleon,

had the

provisions that the person adopting shall be at
least forty years of age,

and at least fifteen years

older than the person adopted.
in

1872,

by Act No.

31.,

YThis was repeated

which provided that any

person above the age of twenty-one years shall have
the right to adopt any one under that age. Succession of Vollmer, 40 La.4nnual, 593;

Sec.2,.12 Civil

Coee Cal provides that the person adopting a child
must be at least ten years older than the person
adopted.
By the law of New York and by the law
of nearly every state a married man or woman cannot
adopt a child without the consent of the other.
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This however, is not an universal rulein Indiana a
married man may adopt a child without his wife's
joining in

the petition and the child may have an

adopting father without an adopting mother.(Barnhizel v. Finell, 47 Ind.,

335 )

But in those

states where the adoption is not invalidated because of non-consent by one spouse, the other is
not bound by the decree.

he.l d
Thus it wasA in Stanley v.

Chandler, 53 Vt., 619, that an adoption, under an
act of the legislature, by a husband without the
consent of his wife did not prevent the wife from
taking one-half of the estate the same as if no
heirs.

Who may be Adopted.

The lahguage used in most statuteis a
,'child'1, this undoubtedly means as it has been worded in the N.Y, statute, and construed in R.I. (In
re. More, 14 R.I. 38

)

to be " any minor child".

Adults can be adoptel La 1ermont, by joining in
the deed of adoption;and the only restriction
Mass.,

in

is that the person adopting be at least

twenty-one years of age and older than the person
adopted, who cannot be his or her wife, husband,
brother, sister, uncle, aunt, either of the whole
or half blood.
In all cases except when the adoption
consists merely in declaring the

eorson adopted an

heir, the adoption must be founded on consent.

The

reason 's that no peroson is supposed to object to
having his financial condition bettered, but to
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take a child away from his kin, and friends and
subject him to the control of a stanger, is such an
interference with the rights of his parents, that
it will not be permitted without their free consent.
Hence all the statutes require the consent of the
parents, parent, guardian, next friend, next of
kin, corporation or other institution having the la
lawful custody of the child affirmatively, or that
notive be given to them so that they may appear and
be heard upon the question of adoption before the
court.
Also, the consent of the child if over 14,
and in N.Y. if over
^twelve, and finally the sanction of the court
It is provided in N.Y. and the same
statute exists in most of the states, in

substance:

,1That the consent is not necessary from a father
or mother deprived of civil rights, or adjudged
4nllty of adultery or cruelty, and who is, for
either cause, divorced; or is adjudged to be an insane person or an habitual drunkard, or is judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account of cruelty or neglect."

-10-

It has been adjudged in New Jersey, that
a parent is deemed to have abandoned his child so
as to render his written consent unnecessary, when
his conduct has evinced a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties, and relinquished all parental
claims to the child and that such an abandonment
irrevocable.

( Winans v.

Ltprie,

20 At.,

969

)

is

Legal Effect.

The legal effect of adoption as provided
in N.Y. statute, L. 1873, oh. 830 as amendodiL. 1887
oh. 703 is as follows:

9 A child when adopted shall

take the name of the person adopting, and the two
thenceforth shall sustain toward each other the
legal relation of parent and child and have all the
rights and be subject to ri

Lc duties of that re-

lation, including the right of inheritance,"and etc.
It is generally provided that the adopted child
shall take the name of the adopting parent.

This

is accomplished by several methods, principally by
statute as in N.Y., Pa.,

and etc., but in Col. the

power is conferred upon the County Courts, and in
Mo., upon the probate courts.
Ey adoption the ado:-ting parent assumes
all the ri-hts, liabilities and duties of the
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nat'iral parent,

even as against the natural parent

or lawful guardian.

The adopting parent 6s entitlef

to the services of the child, but is not entitled

to support even thouhi the child have property of
its own. ( Brown v. Walsh 27 N.J.E.,429.

The adopt-

ing parent rmst provido protection, maintenance and
education for all purposes the same as if it was
kis own legitimate child.

On the other hand the

adopting parent has exclusive control over the
child, and derivos the same benefit from its custody and services as if it was his own.

This is

not the rule in Texas, however, under a modified
system of Spanish law existing in that state the
adopted heir has the rights of a natural child only
with reference to the estate, and does not become
a member.of the family of his adopter, invested
with the privileges and duties peculiar to the relation of parent and chilc.
Texas,

20 )

( Eckford v. Knox,

Vhen there is

67

a conflict between

two parties as to who is the adopted parent the
court alwav

socs the best interest of the child and

awards its custody accordingly.Fouts v.Pierce 63 Ia.71

Inherit ance.

The most irmporta,;t feature of the law of
adoption is the riAght of inheritance and succession
to real and personal property.
i:otives,

One of the p.rimary,

which lead people to take another8child as

their own, is their desire for an heir and thus
keep the bulk of their fortunes in the family name.
As a general rule there is no d~fference in the extent of the inheritance between adopted and natural
legitimate children.

The former take under the

statute of descent and distribution the same as the
latter
later.

with few limitations which will be noticed
The right of inheritance is

made Tutual

between the adopting parent and the child, so that
where the adopted child dies intestate without lawful issue, seized of real estate or owning personal property, which may have come to him from his
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adopted parents sn his property shall descend to
the adottd parents or their heirs at law to the
entire exclusion of his natural heirs at ia7:.(Davis
v. King,
sec. 3,
and

"

95 1nd.,

1)

So under i.Lass.

statute ch.124

providing that when a husband dies intestate,

leaves no'issue living" his widow shall receive

a certain portion of the land and an adopted child
is

,, issue" under such statute (Buckley v.

Frazier,

27 IN.E.,768)

But by a descision of an inferior

court in Penn.

it

was held that an adopting parent

could not inherit from the adopted child.

The

judge holding that adopted children inherit equally
with natural children because the statute expressly
so declares2 and in the absence of a declaration
giving the adopting parent power to inherit that a
strict construction of the statute should be taken.
This undoubtedly is
not good law.

carrying the rule to far and is

But an adopted child cannot inherit

from his adopted parent. ancestors

nor if he hap-

pened to be a grand-son of the adopting father can
he inherit the property of his grandfather in a two-
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fold capacity, as a son and grandson.(Delano v.
Brewster, 148 Mass. ,619)

In Iowa however, it was

decreed that when a father adopted two children of
his daughter, and afterwards died, leaving no will
that the children so adopted would inherit from him
as his own children and would also inherit the
share of their deccased mother.
50 Iowa, 532)
conflict.

(Wagner v.

Varner,

These two cases are in direct

The Mrass.

case is

based upon

the
A
point

that the provision in the statute providing that "
" no person

aiI,

by being adopted, lose his right

to inherit from his natural parents or kindred"
does not include the adopting parent,

Vhile in

the Iowa case the judge thought that the act of
adoption did not take away any existing rightsor
such as may accrue, but gave him certain additional
rights.

This latter view seems to be the more

logical, and would undoubtedly be supported by the
New York courts if the question should arise in
this state.

There being no statute in

this state

like the one in Mass., and our statute being silent
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as to the exact relationship of an adopted child
and its natural parents, the reasoning of the Towa
case would aply.
In

Texas if

the party adopting have at

the time or thereafter a child begotten in lawful
wedlock, the adopted heir cannot inherit more than
one-fourth of the estate of the party adopting him.
(Eckford v. Knox, 67 Texas, 260)
It is provided in several states that the
deed of adoption shall state the terms which the
adopter and adopted shall bear to each other.

Thus

in Nebraska the terms must be stated in the petition,
so in Mississip:i, the petttion must state what
gifts and grants it is proposed to bestow upon the
adopted child.
There are tw6 great limitations to the
adopted chila's

"ri-.t

of inheritance,

namely,

a

stranger cannot be introduced into the right of succession to property limited to a man and
heirs of his body".

" the

Nor can an adoption so dis-

turb the.descent or distribution of the property as
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to enable an adopted child to inherit from the
lineal or collateral kindred of ?his adopting parent
by right of representation.

These are substanti-

ally the limitations imposed in the Mass. statute,
and 11 heirs of the body" in this connection has
been interpretated to have its technical meaning
(2 Redfield on riills, 398-9)
first is obvious.
t,

The reason for the

Property limited to a man and

his heirs" would be entirely within the control

of the devisee, he being able to adopt an heir at
any time and thus destroy the intehtion of the testator.
But as to the latter limitation
do not agree.

the cases

in Indiana the rights of the lawful

children of the adopting yarent and the ado-ted child
are not changed or affected by the adoption.

No

right is given them to inherit frem or through
each other, they are not only not brothers and sisters but they have no rights as such.(Barnhezel v.
Ferrel 47 Ind.,335)

In direct conflict with this

case is the statute of Penn., providing that " if
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he

such adopting parent shall have other childiun,
she or they shall resyectivcly inherit from and

through each other as if all had been lawful childYet it

ren of the same parent."1

has been hell

th-t such adopted child cannot take under a devise
for it

tc the"children" of the parent by adoption;
is

not a child by nature.

(Shafer v.

Enue,

54 Pa.St.

304)
Our New York statute provides that the
child adopted and its

adopted father shall bear to

each other the relation of parent and child uexcept
that as respects the passing and limitation over of
real ahd personal property, under and by deed,
conveyances, wills, devises and trusts dependent
upon the person adopting,

dying without heirs,

said

child adopted shall not be deemed to sustain the
legal relation of child to'the person so adopting
so as to defeat the rights of remaindermen."
case has ever arisen in
been construed,but

No

wihich this provision has

the same reasoning would apply

as to the"heirs"of his body" found in

the statutes
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of the other states.

As to inheriting from tho lin-

eal or collateral Lindrod of its adopting rarent by
right of representation the statute is silent, but
construin-

the statute as a 7holc it

such right existccl.

would scom that

The Relation of an Adoated Child to its

Natural 'Ein.

By ado-tion a child may have a status in
families.

two

Thile he may be a mnember of one family,

he will loose -I.o-n

of the rights which existed beThe statutes

twVoen 1im an" 'As nwstural parents.
of the state vary .....
an a:)-ted chil

Li

defi,.ing the relation of
, and some of

and his natural

the stat utes are silent all together,

so that co-

plication5ofter, arise as to the right of inheritance betv,Torn the _ atural

and those of adoltion.

Let us loch at some of the statutes
statute is
r Yorh
y0

of the various

clear .3 on th-is

states.

2h

1

subject.

I,

provides:- ""hat the parents of an
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adopted child are, ftom the time of ado-tinn, relieved from all parental duties toward and of all
responsibility for, the child so adJ.pted and have
no rights over it."

As we have already seen in

Pennsylvania,-and the same statute also exists in
West Virginia,--the natural children, if any, and
the adopted children inherit from and through each
other.

in Iowa, adopted children inherit from

both their natnral and acopting parents; but in
Conn. and Ill.,

they inherit only from their

adopting~parents.

The adopting parents can-

not inherit from their adopted children in
Georgia, Iowa, Maine, and North Carolina.
In New Mexico an adopted child may be disinherited.
The New York Statute provides that "the
heirs and next of kin of the child so adopted shall
be the same as if the said child was the legitimate
child of the person so adopting" and in case of the
death of tke person so adoptrlg the person so adopting as above provided shall for the purpose of inheritance sustain the relation

of parent to the per-
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chaild is

u I seem
s..
that the

Thus it

son so adoi ted."

entirely cut off from his heirs ac,. r-cxt

of hin oxcept in

the case where pro> 'rty is

to his adoptin- pare'-ts; and the aroDL tin

prnt

li.nitcd
s wo

7-ould inherit from the adopted child to the exclusion
of the natural parents.
It

hcs beeo"

I

nd ,

that where a

child aorC.ted by a husband and '-is wife,jointlydies

without children or their desce.dants;the owner of
land inherited from the adoptins, mother, the surviving husi'and1 and -;dopting fhr
inherits such
land,and it does -ot descend to the natural mother.
Humpherics vs. Davis, lQ&Ind., 274.

This is a very

important and instructivo case, revicing a large
number of aut-.orities, and clearly shows the position of the courts on this subject.
rendering the decision said,-

The judge in

"It is not to be pre-

siumed that the legislature meant to violate logical
rules by creatin: the

egal relation of child without

the corresponding one -f

parent no-

to thrust out the surviving husband

that they meant
and father for

the benefit of a 1-erson that w-as a stranger to the
ancestor ::ho -was tihe sourcn :F title.
princi, le of America± a-- 'o;.i
of failure of descendants
heritance shall so bacfrom which it
harmony it

caudo.

la'.,

it

that in

carea

capable of taking,

to the kinsmrai

a

1s

the in-

of the "Aood

To produce uniformity and

-ust be hold , as we now hold,

death of the adoptcd child casts the

that the

,nh,ritancc

whrich came to him through the joint aldo:rtion bach to
his ado:tive father,

and not upcon the n:atural mother

who was an utter stranger to the person from whoa t
the title flowed.

It may be that this would require

that what the adoptbd , child inherits from its
natural hlinsmen should so back to them, but
it

is

a good -esult,
In

for this is

Wagner vs.

Barner,

a-o-tion v hich in
istin4ights,

&v

of itsolf

so,

no more than right."
Supra,

it

was said:

"because of the adoption the child -requires
additional ri1gts ,but there is

if

nothing in

cert-in

the act of

tahes away other ex-

or such as subsequently

accrue.

The

reason which supports this r-.le does not apply to

-

the

She in

rother.

0.

le:oal

legal

severs all

effect,

rights to the Trr7o.c,,rt y which the aild may acquire
status to the adoytive p.arents for,

by virtue of its

as to that prorerty, she rI.ermits the correlative relat

ion of r arc

a-

child to exist betvieOn the
does her :,o in-

it

child and the adoptivc 7a:'e..

justice to have her with her right to ouch

through

as >cr child may acquire otherwise tha-

permit her to secure child Iin

I

spea1

it

v1ere our statute

natural

in

contstruing

is

it

silent

anc'

ive

ai;o-I

case is

the New YorK

would sUiily and
,.,_

would be the same.
is

by her

this

the most important

car. be

th-'e

a like case should arise

the result

many respects,

its

could seem that

no doubt that if
state

acqui- .

mert,

think the rea°soning in

sound and vould a::ly
statute.

e'

virtue of both

rights."

the

wogld do great injustice to

but it

adoptive rarent,

-r;perty

in

this

This case in
found in

the

reports as it clearly defines the legal status of
all

the parties

inte--cst..

in

the act of afo:tion.

Conflict in the I,,sof AdoTption.

In viev. of the diversity of the statutes
it becomes im~ortwnt to tnquire vnat

termining a
as concers
is

is the ia: de-

rticilar case of ado-tin.
the statut

of the perso

So far

lo-tcd this

to be determined by the lay: of his dIomicil

there

is

though

authority holdting that where the act is

based uvon contract

the la:

relativ,(

to conit-acts

rrevai ls.
The Ian of the nationality
person is
to the

a'ort

to dec ide
.g

in

person;

all

of t-le a 1opted

that concerns his relations

the la.

of the nationality

of the ad:rting person is to dlecide

i

all that con-

corns the relations of the latter to his onn f-alily.
And the la-,* of the domicil and not tue

ia,, of the

nationality is

to determine the status.

In

the

United States where the Ic-iElatl'-n of particular
states C-iffcrs so v~icly

in this connection tD

t'hc the test of nationality ':oulK
Lach of the st,.tes is
state is
its

a -.art of one ratio-_ality;

a distinct nation.

special rle-islatio:,

domicil,

therefore,

be iri~racticable,
no

-ach state howecver has

as to civil status;and
must determine wh-t partLicular

legislation is to a-ly.

in this country therefore

the lavT of the doi.lcil of the parties must determine
the validity of the alol.tion.

if

both parties are

domiciled in the stato of a'ortion, then the adol-tion
should be '-eld extr-ttritcriaiiy

valid,

at least

in all states which accopt the -c'lJy of adowrtion,
or to whose

nuri!rud(ncC
do-tion is

not repugnant.

But no state can declare that a rerson iot its

dom-

iciled subject shall be the -f.o-t cd child of another
7er-on.

Both the adoitcr and the adopted must be

personally subject to th(, !aw s of the state by whom
the adoTt7ion is

e:actoi.

with the consent of its

Thus a chilr

ado: ted,

father and the so.ction of
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a judicial

de-_ree

domiciled

in

Pa-LL.,

at the time,

:-he-c t":o parties

under

child so adoj~ted has the

-auc riht

as the legitimate offspring

adoryting father,
father
icile

is

. statute

hi

entitled,

by -.hich a
of i-Xi ritalce

the estate

after

such father

inherit

their
-mi'ed
dom-

there the real estate of

as against his collateral

though his wife has given rc

hei%s;

format

consent

adoption aq is

required under the st:tutes

Rosc vs.

12

Ross,

L3ass.,

26.

Thiis was acsc

adop.tecd

in

r arents

into Ill.

"7is.,

which

arose between
of

state

iass.

Geraghty, 101
&

hc adoting

its

child Vas

natural -arents

parents,

-,ili

and the court

of inheritance acquired by an

adoirted child under the iaw.s of a-other
adoi:ted,

of

After the death of the adopting

held that the rights

he ws

to the

and subsequently moved with its

parents litia.tion
and the hcirs

in

al-

This oase was

213.

distinruished in part by Keegan vs.

Ill.,

of the

the ado. t ing

-nd the a-o!ted child hive
into Mass. ,to

are

state,

be recognized' and uyhcl

only so far as they be not

whore
in

this

inconsistent w.7-ith
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our laws of descent, so that if such chile cannot
take by descent by our statute, cannot take at all
no matter what may be the law of the state where the
adoption was made.

The distinguishing point in

the two case is that the Mass. court decided that
the status is determined by the law of the domicil
and that this status is to be recognized and upheld
in every other state, so far as it is not inconsistent with its own laws and policy.
ticular ease the laws

of Mass.

In

that par-

and Penr.,

w(re- not

so inconsistent but what effect could 1he 7iven to
the Penn statute in

Mass.,

but in

the 1I7.

case

the judge acknowledging the rule as laid down in
Mass.,

yet thought that the laws of

Vis.,

wore in-

consistent with thqse of ill. so no effect could be
given them.

Performance c-r a Contract to Adopt.

-pecific

ft sometimec, har; ons that persons agree
to adoyt a child and leave it

their prolrty

and

actually taae the child into their fa:il]ies, but
fail to fulfil any of the statu-"tory requirments for
adoption.

in such cases it is not the

statute regulating adoption that is

law or

to -relail

but

the law relative to contracts.

So that where a

certain and definite contract is

clearly established,

even though it

involves an, agreement to leave

property on the part of the -romisee,

equity,

in

a

case free from all objections on account of the adequacy of the consideration,

or other cicumstances

rendering the claim inequitable, wiil compel specific
Perf ormance.

31aesphcre vs.

1.iarkham,

10 Hun,

322.

-30-

The fact of b child entering the family
of another and living with it for a number of years,
fully performing its

part of the contract is a suf-

ficient performance of the contract to take it out
of the operation of the statute of frauds.
vs.

McDLriott,

£.

1c.,

Shnarkey

C47.

Perhaps the best that I can do is

to quote

from Judge Barrets opinion in Gall vs. Gall, 19
N.Y.Sulpp.,

332, which sums up the whole matter and

givol. the rules governing the subject.

Tho Judge

said:-

of .ases the

"It is certain that in this nlF -

ordinary rules which govern in

ctirrs

specific periformance of contracts,

"., compel the
and which fur-

nish reasonable safeguards against f_.,

l-:1c

be extended, but should be regidly applied.

not

These

rules reauire that the contract be certain and definite in

all

its

parts,

that it

be Yrrtual and founded

upon an adequate consideration, and that it be established by the clearest and most convincing evidence.

That the remedy is a matter of judicial

discretion, and that relief should be withheld when

a decree for specific

,er-§ormance
-;'ould ,vor:

in-

justice to innocont th(ird persons or wvrhee it
be contrary to :llblic policy.,,

wuould

The im-ortant

Cases

on this topic are:-

Co-ino v.

Kidd,

19 N.Y.,

VanTino vs. VanTine, 15 At.,

,

335;
-'-.

240

Van Dyne vs. Vreeland, 12 N.J.7q., 142;
Andecrson vs. Shocley, 82 MIo. , 250.

Q.:asi Pur 'ta1

i :tion.

"Then, w:ithout cx - ss contract, a,- infart
is indefinitely taken into a fai.ily not a -An to it
the surrounding circumstances must give construction
to the act, and determine

:hberer the infant is so

taken as a visitor, or a, a ser'a-.t for
c-orncd b- it,
Or

or as a boarlc

tion :-C-2- C-

.gc

to

-fori
or

or

of tIhe

.

, or as a child af-tc.. by the family -1.the
relat

of a child by bloodL

iar relation.

-ore otho- -- ,_1

In the asc - , e of yr of of sur-

rounding c1r--"-.tancec
imrl ic. the l:.v v7il

fro-.ior

a cnt-r-Ect can be

not imn-fose one '-yri

7.Tierc a._< vrh:i..lt

ent aftc

or in

...

the -artics.

v.th
i
Ais yar-

reachin- the arc of -mao.ority, it is

-

-3-

eumbent upon him, to sho: that the ordinary relation
of r-aiPnt and childl cid not exist between
his rarent,

that is

an express co + '

-,

-::- Iiu
between

them that the son should 'Lc oc.-pensated f&r his
Kaye v.

services.
v.

Crau,.ford,

Pillage, 32 77is.,

to natitr-l children

chil

D

-y adoyption.

136.

22 7is.,

320;

Pillage

And the rule relating

appears to ar.rly ertually to

Mountain vs. Fisher, 22 Wis.,

When an infant is taken

93.

into a family, it is al-

ways the presumption that neither its support nor its
services are to be compensated except as the one compensates the other.

Thorp vs. Bateman, 37 Mich., 68.

There being no reason why a child by adoption sharing
the advantages, should not share the disabilities of
a child by blood;or *hy a child received into a
family from beneffoleance should have a larger rule
of right in it than a child in its chatge by order
of nature.

The adoption of an infant into a family

as a child implies no contract to pay for its services
to the fanily;

and an infant so adopted can recover

for such services against the head of the family only

-34upon express contract.
The rule of evidence by which such express contract between parent and child, by blood
or by adoption, must be establisheo,,"
lellage vs. Pellage, 32 Wis.,

136.

laId down in
The Judge says:-

"The rule, is that the evidence of a contract to
compensate the services of a child must be positive
and direct, and the contratt cannot be inferred from
circumstances and probability."
adds by, way of explanation "It
going too far to say that,

And Diahn C.J.,
may perhaps be

in every case of this

kind there must be positive proof of express contract for the payment of wages or the m,ing of pecuniary compensation for the services performed.
There may undoubtedly exist other facts and circumstances clear and unequivocal proof of which according to the rule of evidence held in such cases,
will be equivalent to direct and positive proof of
an express contract.

An express contract to pay,

or the relation of master and servant may.be as fairly
and incontrvertibly established by circumstancial
evidence as by that which is direct."

